No miracles : the failure of Soviet decision-making in the Afghan War /
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Format: | Book |
Language: | English |
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Stanford, California :
Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press,
[2017]
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Table of Contents:
- The Soviet failure in Afghanistan
- Setting the stage : evolution of party-military relations
- Getting in : Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan
- No retreat ... no miracles : Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko in Afghanistan (1980-1985)
- Gorbachev's quest for "reluctant, silent agreement" to withdraw from Afghanistan
- Getting out : Gorbachev and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1986-1989)
- Losing Afghanistan.