Self-deception

Self-deception /

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Funkhouser, Eric (Author)
Corporate Author: ProQuest (Firm)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019.
Series:New problems of philosophy.
Subjects:
Self-deception.
Online Access:Connect to this title online (unlimited simultaneous users allowed; 325 uses per year)

MARC

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100 1 |a Funkhouser, Eric,  |e author. 
245 1 0 |a Self-deception /  |c Eric Funkhouser. 
264 1 |a Abingdon, Oxon ;  |a New York, NY :  |b Routledge,  |c 2019. 
300 |a 1 online resource. 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
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490 1 |a New problems of philosophy 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 0 0 |a Machine generated contents note:   |g 1.  |t Introduction --   |g 1.1.  |t Self-deception: common, yet puzzling --   |g 1.2.  |t Psychological tendencies --   |g 1.3.  |t Why study self-deception? --   |g 2.  |t Basic Problem and a conceptual map --   |g 2.1.  |t Basic Problem --   |g 2.1.1.  |t Static problems --   |g 2.1.2.  |t Dynamic problems --   |g 2.2.  |t classic picture: Freud and Davidson --   |g 2.3.  |t minimal conception: motivated irrationality --   |g 2.3.1.  |t Intentionalism and motivationalism --   |g 2.3.2.  |t Degrees of deception --   |g 2.4.  |t What is the content of the motive? What is the proximate goal? --   |g 2.5.  |t What is the end state? --   |g 2.6.  |t Conceptual map --   |g 2.7.  |t Nearby phenomena --   |g 3.  |t Deflationary accounts --   |g 3.1.  |t Motivated bias accounts: eliminating intention --   |g 3.2.  |t Mele's account --   |g 3.3.  |t Psychological details --   |g 3.3.1.  |t Biases, hot and cold --   |g 3.3.2.  |t Hypothesis framing and confirmation biases --   |g 3.3.3.  |t Belief thresholds and errors --   |g 3.4.  |t Issues with psychological measures --   |g 3.5.  |t Objections --   |g 3.5.1.  |t Negative self-deception --   |g 3.5.2.  |t selectivity problem --   |g 3.5.3.  |t Is this even deception? --   |g 3.5.4.  |t Tension is necessary --   |g 3.6.  |t Anxiety-based deflationary accounts --   |g 4.  |t Intentionalism and divided mind accounts --   |g 4.1.  |t Intentionalism: the general case --   |g 4.1.1.  |t What are intentions? --   |g 4.1.2.  |t case for intentions --   |g 4.1.3.  |t Connection to divided minds --   |g 4.2.  |t Divided mind accounts --   |g 4.2.1.  |t Conscious and unconscious --   |g 4.2.2.  |t Distinct functional units --   |g 4.3.  |t Temporally divided selves --   |g 4.4.  |t Other intentionalist and dual belief views --   |g 5.  |t Revisionary accounts: belief and purpose --   |g 5.1.  |t Revising belief --   |g 5.1.1.  |t Subdoxastic attitudes --   |g 5.1.2.  |t Partial or indeterminate belief --   |g 5.1.3.  |t Thought, acceptance, imagination, and pretense --   |g 5.1.4.  |t Suspicion, anxiety, and fear --   |g 5.2.  |t Biological accounts: non-psychological purposiveness --   |g 5.3.  |t Signaling accounts --   |g 5.3.1.  |t Self-signaling --   |g 5.3.2.  |t Other-signaling --   |g 5.4.  |t Social influences on self-deception --   |g 6.  |t Responsibility for self-deception --   |g 6.1.  |t ethics of belief --   |g 6.2.  |t Self-knowledge --   |g 6.3.  |t Rationality and responsibility --   |g 6.4.  |t Does context matter? --   |g 7.  |t Functions and cost-benefit analysis --   |g 7.1.  |t costs of false belief --   |g 7.2.  |t Psychological benefits --   |g 7.3.  |t Social benefits --   |g 7.4.  |t Biological benefits --   |g 8.  |t Conclusion --   |g 8.1.  |t Future directions --   |g 8.2.  |t Warning. 
533 |a Electronic reproduction.  |b Ann Arbor, MI  |n Available via World Wide Web. 
545 0 |a Eric Funkhouser is a Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Arkansas, USA. He is the author of The Logical Structure of Kinds (2014). 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
650 0 |a Self-deception. 
710 2 |a ProQuest (Firm) 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Funkhouser, Eric, author.  |t Self-deception  |z 9781138506114  |w (DLC) 2019006148 
830 0 |a New problems of philosophy. 
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