Self-deception /

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Funkhouser, Eric (Author)
Corporate Author: ProQuest (Firm)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019.
Series:New problems of philosophy.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to this title online (unlimited simultaneous users allowed; 325 uses per year)
Table of Contents:
  • Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction
  • 1.1. Self-deception: common, yet puzzling
  • 1.2. Psychological tendencies
  • 1.3. Why study self-deception?
  • 2. Basic Problem and a conceptual map
  • 2.1. Basic Problem
  • 2.1.1. Static problems
  • 2.1.2. Dynamic problems
  • 2.2. classic picture: Freud and Davidson
  • 2.3. minimal conception: motivated irrationality
  • 2.3.1. Intentionalism and motivationalism
  • 2.3.2. Degrees of deception
  • 2.4. What is the content of the motive? What is the proximate goal?
  • 2.5. What is the end state?
  • 2.6. Conceptual map
  • 2.7. Nearby phenomena
  • 3. Deflationary accounts
  • 3.1. Motivated bias accounts: eliminating intention
  • 3.2. Mele's account
  • 3.3. Psychological details
  • 3.3.1. Biases, hot and cold
  • 3.3.2. Hypothesis framing and confirmation biases
  • 3.3.3. Belief thresholds and errors
  • 3.4. Issues with psychological measures
  • 3.5. Objections
  • 3.5.1. Negative self-deception
  • 3.5.2. selectivity problem
  • 3.5.3. Is this even deception?
  • 3.5.4. Tension is necessary
  • 3.6. Anxiety-based deflationary accounts
  • 4. Intentionalism and divided mind accounts
  • 4.1. Intentionalism: the general case
  • 4.1.1. What are intentions?
  • 4.1.2. case for intentions
  • 4.1.3. Connection to divided minds
  • 4.2. Divided mind accounts
  • 4.2.1. Conscious and unconscious
  • 4.2.2. Distinct functional units
  • 4.3. Temporally divided selves
  • 4.4. Other intentionalist and dual belief views
  • 5. Revisionary accounts: belief and purpose
  • 5.1. Revising belief
  • 5.1.1. Subdoxastic attitudes
  • 5.1.2. Partial or indeterminate belief
  • 5.1.3. Thought, acceptance, imagination, and pretense
  • 5.1.4. Suspicion, anxiety, and fear
  • 5.2. Biological accounts: non-psychological purposiveness
  • 5.3. Signaling accounts
  • 5.3.1. Self-signaling
  • 5.3.2. Other-signaling
  • 5.4. Social influences on self-deception
  • 6. Responsibility for self-deception
  • 6.1. ethics of belief
  • 6.2. Self-knowledge
  • 6.3. Rationality and responsibility
  • 6.4. Does context matter?
  • 7. Functions and cost-benefit analysis
  • 7.1. costs of false belief
  • 7.2. Psychological benefits
  • 7.3. Social benefits
  • 7.4. Biological benefits
  • 8. Conclusion
  • 8.1. Future directions
  • 8.2. Warning.