On social facts /

Publisher description: Are social groups real in any sense that is independent of the thoughts, actions, and beliefs of the individuals making up the group? Using methods of philosophy to examine such longstanding sociological questions, Margaret Gilbert gives a general characterization of the core...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gilbert, Margaret, 1942-
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1992.
Series:Princeton paperbacks.
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Online Access:Connect to this title online (unlimited users allowed)
Table of Contents:
  • Cover Page
  • Half-title Page
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Dedication Page
  • Contents
  • Preface and acknowledgements
  • I. Introduction: everyday concepts and social reality
  • 1. Preamble
  • 2. The focus and thesis of this book
  • 3. Social science and everyday concepts
  • 4. Weber on everyday collectivity concepts
  • 5. The everyday concept of a collectivity
  • 6. Methodology
  • 7. The main themes
  • 8. Overview of chapters
  • II. 'Social action' and the subject matter of social science
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Weber's account of 'social action'
  • 3. The question of collectivities
  • 4. Further considerations on Weber's concept
  • 5. Conclusions
  • III. Action, meaning, and the social
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The deep level of the discussion
  • 3. Winch on rule-following
  • 4. Kripke's Wittgenstein
  • 5. The intentionalist programme
  • 6. Group languages
  • IV. Social groups: a Simmelian view
  • 1. Introduction: Simmel's statement
  • 2. On Sharing in an action
  • 3. 'We'
  • 4. Social Groups
  • V. After Durkheim: concerning collective belief
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Durkheim on social facts: some salient features of the Rules discussion
  • 3. Assessing accounts of collective beliefs: some tests
  • 4. The simple summative account
  • 5. A second summative account: adding common knowledge
  • 6. A third summative account: the group as cause
  • 7. A nonsummative account of collective belief
  • VI. Social convention
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. David Lewis on convention
  • 3. Critique of Lewis (1): A flawless mechanism?
  • 4. Critique of Lewis (2): Lewis's conditions on convention
  • 5. Critique of Lewis (3): Lewis and the 'ought'of convention
  • 6. Critique of Lewis (4): conventions and collectivities
  • 7. Towards an account of social convention
  • 8. Social convention
  • VII. On social facts
  • 1. The structure of everyday collectivity concepts:summary of results
  • 2. The actions of participating individual men'
  • 3. Concerning 'individualism' versus 'holism'
  • 4. A sketch of some further applications
  • 5. On social facts
  • 6. Afterword
  • Notes
  • Bibliography
  • Index